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SIERRA CLUB V. MORTON: STANDING TREES
IN A THICKET OF JUSTICIABILITY
PATRICK L. BAUDEt
Much has been written about standing; much is even beginning to
be written about how much has been written.1  The extensive com-
mentary was stimulated by explicit recognition in several circuits of the
citizen's suit,2 fortified by four important but not definitive Supreme
Court cases3 which, although dealing with other problems of standing,
seemed to sanction the lower courts' new receptivity to plaintiffs whose
injuries were not special or direct. Those who follow Supreme Court deci-
sions, especially environmental and consumer-interest lawyers, therefore
eagerly awaited clarification by the Supreme Court following its grant of
certiorari in an important Ninth Circuit case, Sierra Club v. Hickel.4 A
minor feature of the Supreme Court's opinion' was its exchange of
quotations. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the court, drew on Tocque-
ville's usually overlooked qualificaion of his familiar observation on the
dominant role of the Judiciary in the United States ;6 Mr. Justice Black-
mun, dissenting, preferred to read Donne's metaphorical "No man is an
island . . ." with pointed ecological literalism.' The lawyer trying to
find exactly what the opinion holds and portends may prefer Horace's
"Mountains will be in labor to give birth to a ridiculous mouse."'
Mineral King is a scenic valley located within the Sequoia National
Forest, bounded on three sides by the Sequoia National Park. National
forests are under the administration of the Department of Agriculture,
national parks under the Department of the Interior.9 Mineral King
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington.
1. Not counting the Epimendian statement in the text, see for example, Jaffe,
Standing Again, 84 HA v. L. REv. 633 (1971) ("enormous and adequate"); Rogers,
The Alice-in-Wonderland World of Standing, 1 ENV. L. 169, 170 (1971) (quoting Jaffe) ;
Vardaman, Standing to Sue in Historic Preservation Cases, 36 LAW & CONTEaIP. PROB.
406 (1971) ("vast amount").
2. The cases are collected in Annot., 11 A.L.R. FED. 556 (1972).
3. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) ; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968);
Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968). See Davis, The Liberalized Law of
Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970).
4. 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
5. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
6. Id. at 740-41 n.16.
7. Id. at 760 n.2.
8. HoRAcE ON PoaraY: TEE ARs POETICA 60 (C. Brink ed. 1971).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970) (national forests); 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (national
parks). See Comment, The Role of the Judiiary in the Confrontation with the Prob-
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Valley is also a game refuge, which excepts it from the general hunting
permission for national forests and gives the Secretary of the Interior
responsibility for wildlife.'" Since 1949 Mineral King has been designat-
ed a Recreation Area," and the Department of Agriculture has attempted
to interest commercial developers, who have been deterred largely by the
highly limited access-a narrow, winding and only partly graded moun-
tain road crossing the National Park.
In 1965 the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service again
solicited bids for the commercial development of public recreation at
Mineral King. To encourage these plans, the State of California approved
funds for the construction of a new, straighter and better-surfaced road
through Sequoia National Park, 2 for which the Secretary of the In-
terior's consent would be necessary.3 Later in 1965, the Forest Service
chose Walt Disney Enterprises' bid from the six submitted, granting
Disney authority to prepare a master plan for the recreational facilities.
The plan, approved in 1969, calls not only for hotels and parking lots to
accommodate 14,000 daily visitors to the wilderness, but also for facilities
to comfort those for whom the wild is too much: a chapel, a heated
swimming pool, and even a theater (one wonders whether nature films
will be shown)."4
The Sierra Club was not monolithically opposed to all "improve-
ments" in the valley. In 1965, when the project was less grandiose in
conception, an officer of the club had testified before Congress against the
development of commercial skiing at San Gorgonio on the ground that
Mineral King was better suited.' Faced with the Disney plan, however,
the Sierra Club strongly objected, suing for injunctive and declaratory
relief on several grounds. That portion of the planned development within
the Mineral King Valley was attacked as a misuse of the Secretary of
Agriculture's permit powers. The Secretary may issue two sorts of per-
mits for the use of forest land: a term permit for eighty acres" and a
lems of Environmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1070, 1083 n.47 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
10. 16 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). See Comment, supra note 9.
11. U.S. Dl'T OF AGRICuLTURE FOREST SERVICE, MINERAL. KING, A PLANNED
RECREATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 3 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FOREST SERVICE].
12. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir. 1970).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 8a (1970). See Comment, supra note 9.
14. There are many sources for the facts of the controversy. See, e.g., FOREST
SERVICE, supra note 11; Browning, Mickey Mouse in the Mountains, HARPER'S, March,
1972, at 65.
15. Hearings on H.R. 6891 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House
Comm. on; Interior and Insular Affairs, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 36, at 344 (1965).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 497 (1970).
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revocable permit unrestricted in area."7 To accommodate all Disney's
plans the Secretary had to issue both sorts, thereby arguably thwarting
either the acreage limitation or the authority to revoke (in practice if not
theory, since revocation would destroy a good-faith investment of 36
million dollars). Features of the plan outside Mineral King itself were
also attacked. The highway proposal was alleged to violate road standards
of the National Park Service, prepared under statutory authority, which
disapproved the construction of roads through national parks leading
elsewhere (in this case, of course, to a national forest)."s The highway
plan was also assailed for lack of public hearings, which would have been
required under Interior Department regulations of doubtful status.' The
proposed development also required the construction of a power line
through the National Park, for which, depending on one's interpretation
of the appropriate statute, congressional approval may be required." The
Sierra Club also joined claims that various administrative actions con-
flicted with the guiding principles of the statutes conferring administra-
tive jurisdiction."-
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia held that the Sierra Club had standing to bring the suit and granted
17. This power is derived from the Secretary's general authority to manage the
National Forests. 16 U.S.C. § 497 (1970). See Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24,
34 (9th Cir. 1970) ; 35 Op. ATr'y GEN. 485 (1928).
18. General road-building authority is given by 16 U.S.C. § 8 (1970): "The
Secretary of the Interior . . . is authorized to construct, reconstruct, and improve
roads and trails . . . in the national parks. . . ." Id. This sectiqn even gave rise
to an argument that the Secretary had to build the road himself (one hopes with help
from his Department) rather than permit the state to do it.
The relevant standard is in U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, PARK
ROAD STANDARDS 11 (1968).
19. 34 Fed. Reg. 1405 (1969). The regulations were adopted by Secretary Udall
without public notice and hearing. They were revoked by his successor, 34 Fed. Reg.
6985 (1969), a revocation allegedly ineffectual because done without public notice and
hearing.
20. Provided, That no permit, license, lease, or authorization for dams, con-
duits, reservoirs, power houses, transmission lines, or other works for storage
or carriage of water, or for the development, transmission, or utilization of
power within the limits of said park as constituted by said sections, shall be
granted or made without specific authority of Congress.
16 U.S.C. § 45c (1970).
21. This argument might have had greater force if the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970) (NEPA) had been in effect. See
Hanks & Hanks, An Environmwntal Bill of Rights: The Citizen Snit and the National
EnAronment Policy Act of 1969,24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970).
NEPA, although not retroactive, has been applied to actions taken after its effective
date to further projects begun before. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of
Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (D. Ark. 1970). After the Supreme Court's opinion the
Sierra Club amended its complaint to add a claim under the Act. See Sierra Club v.
Morton, 4 ENv. REP. C. 1543 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12, 1972).
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a preliminary injunction against issuance of the required permits.2 A
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding, two to one,
that the Sierra Club lacked standing, and, unanimously, that the possi-
bility of ultimate success on the merits was so remote as to render the pre-
liminary injunction an abuse of discretion.2 3 The appellate court distin-
guished two earlier cases, which had recognized the Sierra Club's stand-
ing to preserve the wilderness from administrative encroachment. These
cases were thought to be different because in those instances "the Sierra
Club was joined by local conservationist organizations made up of local
residents and users of the area affected by the administrative action.
24
This distinction seems fair for one of the prior decisions since that case's
plaintiffs included
several residents and property owners in the nearby town of
Vail, Colorado; a guide who conducts wilderness trips into
East Meadow Creek; the Eagles Nest Wilderness Committee,
Colorado Open Space Coordinating Council, and the Sierra
Club, conservation groups; the Town of Vail; and Colorado
Magazine.25
In the other Sierra Club standing case the club was joined by the
Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley," and by a New York village."
The Ninth Circuit's distinction between this case and the case before it
amounts to saying that the Hudson Valley Committee is a "local conser-
vation organization" for the Hudson Valley whereas the Sierra Club is
not for the Sierra Nevada *Mountains: the court does not explain why
the Sierra Club is made an inappropriate plaintiff to protect the Sierras
either by its parallel concern for other areas such as the Hudson Valley
or by its willingness to accept as members citizens from throughout the
United States who are interested in protecting the Sierras. In any event,
the Second Circuit in finding standing in the Citizens Committee case
drew no distinction between the Sierra Club and the Hudson Valley Com-
ittee .2  The Ninth Circuit's distinction of these Sierra Club cases-as
22. Sierra Club v. Hickel, Civil No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 1968), reprinted in
0. GRAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 35 (1970).
23. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
24. Id. at 33.
25. Parker v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 685, 687 (1969), afj'd, 448 F.2d 793
(10th Cir. 1971). The district court's finding of standing was not discussed by the
Tenth Circuit.
26. Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
27. The village had severe standing problems of its own. 425 F.2d at 105-06.
28. Two of the plaintiffs (the Citizens Committee and the Sierra Club)
made no claim that the proposed Expressway or the issuance of the dredge
200
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well as the distinction it might have drawn of a case it decided well before
the recent bullish trend in standing -- is particularly interesting for its
casual acceptance of the unarticulated premise that one plaintiff's standing
takes care of another's.30
The Ninth Circuit found the Sierra Club itself without standing
because it had not been injured in fact. The court, after restating the two-
part test of Data Processing3 ' and Barlow,3" that the complainant must
suffer injury in fact and that he must seek to protect an interest arguably
within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the constitutional or
statutory provision in question, concluded that the second part "does not
establish a test separate and apart from or in addition to the test which
the Court first looked to. .... ."" The Ninth Circuit's excision is no
doubt salutary"4 but not the ordinary way in which courts of appeals treat
recent Supreme Court holdings. In any case, the Sierra Club failed the
first branch of the test; the court rejected the notion that general review
statutes ought to be read broadly to make an unofficial group a private
attorney general.3"
and fill permit threatened any direct personal or economic harm to them.
Instead they asserted the interest of the public in the natural resources, scenic
beauty and historical value of the area immediately threatened with drastic
alteration, claiming that they were "aggrieved" when the Corps acted ad-
versely to the public interest. They are, as the federal defendants observe,
serving as "private Attorney Generals" to protect the public interest.
425 F.2d at 102. But see West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek
Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971) (distinguishing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Sierra Club to uphold the standing of a local group dedicated to preserving scenic and
historic areas in the West Virginia highlands).
29. In 1953, in a suit to review the Federal Power Commission's licensing of a
municipal dam, the court held that two state government departments and the Wash-
ington State Sportsmen's Council, Inc., "All are 'parties aggrieved' since they claim
that the Cowlitz Project will destroy fish in which they, among others, are interested
in protecting." Washington Dep't of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391, 395 n.l1 (9th Cir.
1953).
If the Sportsmen's Council was aggrieved in 1953 because of its interest
in protecting fish, surely the Sierra Club was aggrieved in 1970 because of
its interest in protecting a national park and forest.
71 COLUx. L. REv. 176-77 (1971). But the Sportsmen's case could be distinguished
not only because of the governmental co-plaintiffs, but also because the review, arose
under the Federal Power Act rather than under the Administrative Procedure Act
alone or because the agency had already permitted intervention by the Sportsmen's
Council.
30. But cf. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 91-92 (1947).
31. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970).
32. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
33. 433 F.2d at 31.
34. Mr. justice Brennan in his separate opinion for the Camp and Barlow cases
views the second test as superfluous not because it duplicates the first but because it
improperly anticipates questions of reviewability and the substantive law. 397 U.S. at
167, 169.
35. A less restrictive view of the opinion is suggested by the Court's statement
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In this vein, the court found it easy to distinguish the four standing
cases relied on by the district court. Scenic Hudso.3 6 was a review of an
administrative proceeding in which the various plaintiffs had participated
as parties. Chitrch of Christ3" was a "consumer case" holding that those
who listen to a radio station are naturally those aggrieved by its licensing.
Road Review Leagife and Powelton39 both involved, among other plain-
tiffs, property owners whose land would be taken by proposed federal pro-
jects. The bases for distinguishing these cases are substantial, so that
the Ninth Circuit's denial of standing to the Sierra Club, although pro-
bably challenging the Second Circuit's holding in Citizens Committee,
is not irreconcilable with most of the other recent expansive standing
decisions. 0
After disposing of standing, the court of appeals turned to the
that standing should be found where "an element of legal wrong" is inflicted on the
plaintiff or "he is adversely affected by agency action or aggrieved within the meaning
of a relevant statute." 433 F.2d at 32 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit, however,
took its definition of "aggrieved" from BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 87 (4th ed. 196S)
("Having suffered loss or injury; damnified; injured") rather than from 1 OxFoD
ENGLISH DicrloNAaY 182 (1933) ("having cause of grief or offence" illustrated
by "The Catholics had a right to feel aggrieved that these laws should be permitted to
remain in the statute book.") Professor Davis is surely right about "interest," "ad-
versely affected" and "aggrieved":
each concept becomes a receptacle for ideas about standing, but what is read
into any one concept could just as readily be read into either of the others.
3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 216 (1958).
36. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
37. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
38. Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
39. Powelton Civic Home Owners Assoc. v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
40. Contra, 71 CoLua. L. REv. 172, 176 (1971), arguing: (1) that the distinction
of consumer cases is "strained"; (2) that the presence of parties with clear standing
in Road Review League and Scenic Hudson doesn't explain the holding that the citizens
groups also have standing; and (3) that the real standing issue in both Scenic Hudson
and Sierra Club was whether the plaintiffs were "aggrieved" within the meaning of
the relevant statutory authorization of review, although the statute was in one case
the Federal Power Act and in the other the Administrative Procedure Act.
My disagreement with this note is based on: (1) a line of cases cited in Church
of Christ early recognizing the special status of consumers, e.g., Reade v. Ewing, 205
F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953) ; (2) the Ninth Circuit's seeming acceptance of the notion of
"pendent standing"; and (3) the fact that the plaintiffs in Scenic Hudson had been
permitted to intervene in the agency proceedings. The Supreme Court opinion in
Sierra Club set aside its holding in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971), because "no question of standing was raised." Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 734 n.7 (1972). In fact standing was discussed by the district court in
Overton Park, and sustained because the plaintiffs had been permitted to intervene in
the agency proceedings. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp.
1189, 1191-92 (W.D. Tenn. 1970). But see Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention
Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Harv. L. REv. 721, 728 (1968).
SIERRA CLUB V. MORTON
merits for the purpose of evaluating the district court's issuance of the
preliminary injunction. The court does not explain the reason for going
beyond standing; one explanation may have been a perceived need to fore-
stall reissuance of the injunction in the event Sierra Club amended its
complaint to allege an injury in fact or to join a more local conservation
organization (which could no doubt have been easily formed for the
occasion among some of the 27,000 club members who, according to the
complaint, resided in the San Francisco Bay area).' In any event, the
court concluded that examination of the club's probability of ultimate
success on the merits showed that a preliminary injunction was unjusti-
fied. The court sustained the combination of term and revocable permits
because the practice is not specifically prohibited and has been sanctioned
by established administrative practice in eighty-four instances.42 With
respect to the highway location dispute, the court found that the route
already existed and was simply being improved; therefore hearings were
not clearly required and in any case were held, albeit by the state highway
division. 3 The statute requiring congressional approval of transmission
lines was construed, for contextual and practical reasons, to apply only to
lines in connection with hydroelectric development projects.44 The claim
that the development would be inconsistent with the statutory policies
establishing a game refuge was, without further discussion, declared of
"no substance.""5
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision on standing
without ruling on the propriety of the injunction.4" The Supreme Court's
opinion begins its discussion of standing by setting aside all previous
Supreme Court standing cases.
41. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 735-36 n.8.
42. 433 F.2d at 35.
43. Id. at 36-37.
44. Id. at 37.
45. Id.
46. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The net effect, for this litiga-
tion, was to affirm both grounds, since a complaint amended to satisfy standing and
refiled in the Northern District of California would still be subject to the court of
appeals' views on the propriety of preliminary relief.
It could be argued that the court of appeal's opinion on the injunction is not
binding, since it found the controversy one which federal courts could not adjudicate
because of plaintiff's lack of standing. Cf. Freund, Discussion, in SuPnEmE CoURT AND
SUPREME LAW 35 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). If the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate itself
a suitable litigant with respect to the merits of the controversy, which seems to be
what it means to lack standing, there is no reason to suppose it a party appropriate to
present the extraordinary showing requisite to preliminary relief.
Still, the district judge knew what to do when the amended complaint was filed;
he refused the preliminary injunction but denied the motion to dismiss the complaint.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 4 ENv. RE. C. 1543 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 12, 1972).
203
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Where, however, Congress has authorized public officials to
perform certain functions according to law, and has provided
by statute for judicial review of those actions under certain
circumstances, the inquiry as to standing must begin with a
determination of whether the statute in question authorizes
review at the behest of the plantiff.7
The inquiry seems not only to begin there but also to end there, since the
Court does not, after preliminary reference, return to discussion of Baker
v. Carr" or Flast v. Cohen.4" The statutory provision here in question
is § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,5" recently given a seemingly
definitive construction in Data Processing and Barlow."' According to
the Court, the two-part invention of those cases is inapplicable because the
plaintiffs in those cases alleged potential pecuniary loss resulting from the
official action complained of:
These palpable economic injuries have long been recognized as
sufficient to lay the basis for standing, with or without a spe-
cific statutory provision for judicial review. Thus, neither
Data Processing nor Barlow addressed itself to the question,
which has arisen with increasing frequency in federal courts in
recent years, as to what must be alleged by persons who claim
injury of a noneconomic nature to interests that are widely
shared.52
The Court goes on to recognize that "aesthetic and environmental" 3
harms may also constitute injuries in fact, but in the circumstances of this
case
[t]he impact of the proposed changes in the environment
of Mineral King will not fall indiscriminately upon every
citizen. The alleged injury will be felt directly only by those
who use Mineral King and Sequoia National Park, and for
whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be
47. 405 Us. at 732.
48. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
49. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970):
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof.
Id.
51. See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
52. 405 U.S. at 733-34.
53. Id. at 734.
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lessened by the highway and ski resort. The Sierra Club
failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any
of their activities or pastimes by the Disney development. No-
where in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state that its
members use Mineral King for any purpose, much less that
they use it in any way that would be significantly affected by
the proposed actions of the respondents."
Nor can the Sierra Club succeed as a "private attorney general." The
traditional cases, 5 according to the Court, construe the "person aggrieved"
provisions of the typical review statutes to give standing to those who
sustain economic injury; the Court will recognize additional categories of
injury - "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational,"' 6 but will not re-
place injury with a mere "interest."' 7 This extension is refused for two
stated reasons: first, because of the impossibility of drawing objectively
based lines between the Sierra Club and small or short-lived organiza-
tions, or even merely interested citizens ;"8 and second, because the injury
requirement serves "as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to
whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct
stake in the outcome."" The first reason may be acceptable to those who
have little faith in judicial discretion, although they would no doubt reject
the remaining part of United States constitutional law. The second justi-
fication would be convincing only if the Court had bothered to explain
why even a smooth attempt to limit review to those who have a direct
stake is a good idea, or even, for that matter, why an "interest" is less a
"direct stake" than is an aesthetic injury. Mrs. Frothingham ° no doubt
found the Maternity Act an ugly distortion of the symmetry of federal-
ism. And indeed, why should an eyesore be an injury if a moral outrage is
not? The Sierra Club was certainly within the class of persons outraged
by the Disney development.
There were three dissents." Mr. justice Douglas borrows Chris-
topher Stone's brilliantly serious whimsy6 to suggest that the suit could
54. Id. at 735.
55. See Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
56. 405 U.S. at 738. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organization v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
57. 405 U.S. at 739.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 740.
60. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
61. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate, so that the opinion lacks
support of a majority of the total membership. Mr. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence
may, however, safely be inferred from his opinion in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972). See text accompanying note 88 infra.
62. Stone, Should Trees Have Standingf-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
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be treated as an in rem action, with the "river as plaintiff" and the Sierra
Club next friend: "The voice of the inanimate object, therefore, should
not be stilled."63 Mr. Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion suggests
two alternative conclusions. Either the preliminary injunction
should be continued on condition that the plaintiff amend its complaint to
meet the Court's requirements, or the concept of standing should be im-
aginatively expanded to
enable an organization such as the Sierra Club, possessed, as
it is, of pertinent, bona fide and well-recognized attributes and
purposes in the area of environment, to litigate environmental
issues.6 '
He then suggests that the "eloquent" Douglas opinion provides a sticking-
point adequate to resolve the majority's line-drawing problem. Mr. jus-
tice Douglas concurred in the Blackmun opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan, in
a one paragraph opinion, agreed with that part of the Blackanum opinion
which supported the standing of the Sierra Club.6"
It is not easy to tell if Sierra Club is really just a pleading case. The
opinion suggests that the result might be different if the plaintiff had
stated that any of its members used Mineral King, especially if their use
were alleged to be significantly affected by the development. The implica-
tion that such allegations would support standing has led one commenta-
tor to conclude that "the Sierra decision should not be a significant road-
block to public actions to protect the environment." 6 There is internal
evidence supporting this view. The opinion states, of course, that aesthe-
tic or environmental injuries could suffice for standing. Furthermore,
the Court in a footnote 7 seems to approve a number of recent cases
"broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of
standing."6 Thus the opinion approves the two cases distinguished by
the Ninth Circuit,68 as well as an old consumer case," a recent case sus-
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972). One of Stone's less solemn authorities is
a New York Supreme Court case discussing the equal protection rights of a mouse
named Morris (undoubtedly cousin to one of Disney's creatures). Id. at 455 n.23a.
63. 405 U.S. at 749.
64. Id. at 757.
65. Id. at 755.
66. Sedler, Standing, JTsticiability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25
VAND. L. REv. 479, 509 (1972).
67. 405 U.S. at 738 n.13.
68. Id. at 738.
69. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, C.J.); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
70. Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
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taining the standing of the Sierra Club and other organizations because
their members are unwilling consumers of DDT residues,7 and a case per-
mitting suit by those allegedly about to be irradiated from a project of the
Atomic Energy Commission.72 The cases which have gone beyond
recognizing "organizational interest" as standing, seem to be less approved
than tolerated for the reason that "[i]n most, if not all of these cases, at
least one party to the proceeding did assert an individualized injury either
to himself or, in the case of an organization, to its members."7
The conclusion is inviting, then, that the Sierra Club had standing
but failed to plead it properly. The difficulty with the conclusion is that it
seems strange as a matter of procedure. Complaints under the Federal
Rules are not to be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would
entitle him to relief. ' '7 4 That statement could hardly be taken literally but,
even so, cannot easily be squared with the holding in Sierra Club. The
complaint not only alleged that 27,000 members of the club lived near San
Francisco but also that
the Sierra Club by its activities and conduct has exhibited a
special interest in the conservation and sound maintenance of
the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country
... . One of the principal purposes of the Sierra Club is to
protect and conserve the natural resources of the Sierra Nevada
Mountains.7
Utterly consistent with that allegation are the assertions in an amicus
brief, quoted by the court, that the club regularly guides camping trips
into Mineral King and that its members often go to the valley for recrea-
tional purposes."8
There are, however, two reasons that may justify special rules re-
quiring greater specificity for standing allegations. First, it is important
that the jurisdiction of a court of limited jurisdiction be made to appear
in the complaint.7  To an uncertain extent standing is an element of the
"'cases or controversies" to which the Constitution limits federal judicial
71. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (1970).
72. Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).
73. 405 U.S. at 739 n.14.
74. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), construing FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a) (2).
75. 405 U.S. at 735-36 n.8.
76. Id. (brief of the Wilderness Society).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (1). See generally, 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDuRE 74.81, 106-07 (1969).
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power.78 The facts upon which standing is based are not ordinarily in-
cluded in the jurisdictional section of the complaint,"9 but similar policies
might call for similar treatment if there is good reason to anticipate a sub-
stantial resulting question of federal judicial power, especially when pre-
liminary injunctive relief is sought.
Indeed the injunction may have forced the issue in Sierra Club. Had
the district court not granted the injunction there would have been no
interlocutory appeal and the appellate court would have had before it the
record of testimony at trial, which might well have disclosed the frequency
with which Sierra Club activities and members were associated with
Mineral King. Of course the court to which an interlocutory appeal is
taken must be able to dismiss the complaint for plaintiff's lack of stand-
ing,8" but dismissal is not necessarily appropriate where the facts upon
which standing turns, in the judgment of the appellate court, are neither
in the record nor inconsistent with the complaint. Even in such an as yet
unilluminated case, though, the older formulation of the conventional
preliminary injunction rule, that an order should not issue if the case is a
doubtful one,8 ' would justify reversal--certainly this principle makes its
strongest claim where the doubt concerns the propriety or power of any
action at all by a federal court. The trouble with so defending the
Supreme Court's disposition in Sierra Club is that good sense and the
modern authorities82 both reformulate the rule so that doubtfulness is to
be considered only together with the balance of irreparable harm to the
parties. This line of analysis would then have led the Court to assess the
merits of the Sierra Club's case for the purpose of balancing them against
the Court's appraisal of the extent of irreparable harm to aesthetic and
environmental interests the club might be entitled to represent, all in order
to explain why the business was no business of a federal court.
The result is logical enough but so easily susceptible to misconstruc-
tion as a validation of the Mineral King project that only an unusually
forceful casuist could convince the public that the Court had not approved
Disney's plan. The same policies could be served, however, by a categori-
78. Compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 753 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(appended remarks of the Solicitor General) with Berger, Standing to Sue in Public
Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE LJ. 816 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Berger].
79. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. App. Form 2(b).
80. E.g., Taylor v. Cohen, 405 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1968).
81. E.g., CORE v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 829(1963).
82. See Liberty Lobby v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1968); B.W.
Photo Util. v. Republic Molding Corp., 280 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1960). See generaly,
Developments in the Law--Injunctions, 78 HAR v. L. Ra,. 994, 1056-61, (1965).
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cal rule requiring detailed allegations of standing for preliminary injunc-
tion. In the ordinary case the showing of irreparable harm will leave no
doubt of standing. In the extraordinary public-interest case there will
seldom be occasion for concern with visiting the consequences of artless
pleading on hapless plaintiffs; the plaintiff is probably not an appropriate
representative of the public interest if its lawyers haven't read Sierra
Club and plead their case accordingly.
There may be a more general reason for requiring detail in the com-
plaint of a case like Sierra Club; a reason, that is, which would have justi-
fied dismissal of the complaint even if no preliminary injunction had been
sought. Generally worded complaints are the modern practice not because
courts now prefer ill-defined issues in litigation, but because there are
other procedural devices to define the case before trial. In the typical
case, say an automobile accident, exploration of the event itself almost
inevitably shapes the subject of the dispute. Even in many suits against
government officers, the emerging facts narrow the issues. One of the
most celebrated, or at least controversial, early pleading decisions under
the Federal Rules found a complaint to state a claim for relief from an
unlawful misappropriation by a customs officer in the following two al-
legations: "he sold my merchandise to another bidder with my price of
$110, and not of his price of $120" and "three weeks before the sale, two
cases, of 19 bottles each case, disappeared." 3 Such a complaint can be
tolerated because the case will not become a wide-ranging inquiry into the
legitimacy of the customs process; the plaintiff's disclosed interest will
always limit the issue to the sale and disappearance of his bottles.
Sierra Club is a different matter. Various features of the develop-
ent plan are attacked for separate reasons, with varying degrees of sub-
stantiality. The improved road through the park may well, as Mr. Justice
Blackmun suggests with impressive detail, threaten the "beauty, solitude
and quiet"' 4 of the wilderness. But the injury from the noise and fumes
of the traffic is distinct from the question whether a power transmission
line may be buried under the road or whether the tourist facilities inside
the game refuge are consistent with the protection of wildlife. Requiring
the Sierra Club to allege in precisely what way its members will sufer
thus serves to give the defendants an opportunity to know exactly which
challenges they must meet, and to give the court an opportunity to decide
that some features of the development plan need not be defended. This
screening becomes crucial if the onl3 real interferences with club activities
or interests are by clearly valid features of the plan. For example, the
83. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
84. 405 U.S. at 759.
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Solicitor General asserted at oral argument that plaintiff's only substantial
legal objection, on the merits, was to the power line.8" The line itself,
however, was to be buried under the road at the time of road construction.
Whether Sierra Club had a case worth hearing and worth forcing the
government to defend would, on this analysis, depend specifically on
whether any of its members were accustomed to digging in the immediate
area with metal tools.
This possible reading makes the case more than a pleading decision,
however, for it is based upon substantive notions of separability;8" upon
the premise that the elements of "public interest" which a plaintiff may
raise depend in part upon the nature of its injury. This premise is not
inconsistent with the Court's statement that
once review is properly invoked, [an injured] person may
argue the public interest in support of his claim that the agency
has failed to comply with its statutory mandate,"7
because the plaintiff may have separable claims, perhaps that different
statutes have not been complied with, perhaps even by different agencies
(as in Sierra). To deny a plaintiff permission to argute the public
interest in support of one claim which it is entitled to have adjudicated
would induce deliberate purblindness in the judicial process; but to per-
mit generalized allegations of standing would have the different con-
sequence of stopping substantive conduct the plaintiff could otherwise
not prevent. The Supreme Court, in a case decided after Sierra Club,
has taken a strict view of separability. In Moose Lodge No. 107 V.
Irvis"8 the Court held that a black plaintiff who had been refused as a guest
at a private club was without standing to raise the issue that the club
also discriminated by refusing membership to blacks. The Court's ex-
planation was in terms of standing to raise the rights of third parties,
rather than to raise additional issues, but the distinction seems purely
verbal.8 9
Another way of stating the problem is to ask what the Sierra Club
must now allege. The holding would not be much of an obstacle if the
following allegation sufficed: "The Sierra Club by its activities and con-
85. 2 ENV. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 848-49 (1971).
86. See H. HART & H. WECESLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEMt
177-80 (1953).
87. 405 U.S. at 737.
88. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
89. Sometimes the issue of standing to raise the rights of third parties is distinct
from the question of defining the litigants' own rights, sometimes not. See generally
Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. REv. 433,
440-41 (1962).
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duct has exhibited a special interest in the conservation and sound main-
tenance of the Mineral King Game Refuge and the Sequoia National
Park.""0 Such a modest change would make the club very close to a "local
conservation group" thereby perhaps satisfying the Ninth Circuit. The
Supreme Court, however, suggests that the "alleged injury will be felt
directly only by those who use Mineral King . . . and for whom the
aesthetic and recreational values will be lessened.. .. "" Scarcely less
restrictive, though, would be the requirement that the complaint allege:
The Sierra Club has conducted regular camping trips into the
Mineral King area, and various members of the Club have used
and continue to use the area for recreational purposes. These
activities will be adversely affected by the defendants' issuance
of the permits and licenses hereafter described.
The Court expressly left open the possibility that facts like these might
amount to standing.92  *Mr. Chief Justice Burger, sitting as Circuit
Justice, has recently found similar allegations to be adequate.9" However,
if this latter allegation sufficed the case would be no more than a prodigi-
ous waste of judicial effort (or a veiled limitation on the preliminary in-
junction). 9 The Supreme Court may have sought an inconsequential
90. During oral argument Mr. Justice White asked the Solicitor General if
all that was needed was for the Sierra Club to amend the complaint alleging
a special interest in the Mineral King Valley. Mr. Griswold responded that
this would help.
2 ENv. REP. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 848 (1971).
91. 405 U.S. at 735 (emphasis added).
92. The Court, after reciting the Wilderness Society's description of the club's
activities said:
Moreover, the Sierra Club in its reply brief specifically declines to rely on
its individualized interest, as a basis for standing. . . . Our decision does not,
of course, bar the Sierra Club from seeking in the District Court to amend its
complaint by a motion under Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
405 U.S. at 735-36 n.8.
93. With obvious reluctance the Chief justice refused to stay a District Court
decision permitting a public-interest group (five law students) to challenge the ICC
rate schedule for non-recyclable goods upon the allegation
that its members use the forests, streams, mountains, and other resources in
the Washington [D.C.] area for camping, hiking, fishing, and sightseeing, and
that this use is disturbed by the adverse environmental impact cause [sic] by
nonuse of recyclable goods.
Aderdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, - U.S.-, - , 93 S. Ct. 1, 5 (1972)
(brackets in the original).
94. In its brief the plaintiff claimed to have refused to allege "private, unique
injury" to escape the resulting trap that the injunction would be denied. The Court
said that the
short answer to this contention is that the "trap" does not exist. . . . Once
this standing is established, the party may assert the interests of the general
public in support of his claims for equitable relief.
405 U.S. at 740 n.15.
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basis of decision as a way of avoiding the greater issue. A case like one of
those approved in the Sierra opinion would be an easier instance to de-
fend the standing of citizens' action groups. The Sierra Club may partly
have chosen its pleading theory to yield the most extravagant recognition
possible for the citizen's action, a choice some would excuse the Court
from seconding.
THE GARDEN IN THE WILDERNESS
Whatever the uncertainties in the future sweep of the Sierra Club
decision, it shares with most of the Court's standing decisions an almost
total failure to relate its conclusions to the policies underlying the exercise
of judicial review. At the immediate level, the reason for requiring a
plaintiff to demonstrate actual hurt is to assure vigorous advocacy in the
presentation of all the facts and arguments which the court may need to
make sound decision possible. But as Professor Jaffe has argued with
irresistible force, a litigant whose motives are ideological frequently is
the most dedicated and well-equipped champion of the issues." Why then
should the Sierra Club be forced to validate its right to sue by finding
among its members a casual camper in the valley? The Supreme Court's
answer, reminiscent of one of 'Marshall's major arguments in Marbury
v. Madison,"7 is that the suit is unnecessary if no affected person sues. 8
Thus the Supreme Court ultimately justifies its holding, as did the Ninth
Circuit, with respect to whether the suit should have been brought at all,
rather than by whom.
Perhaps the greatest source of confusion in the law surrounding the
standing problem is the distinction between the "who" and the "what,"
between standing and justiciability." Clarity can be gained by provi-
sional acceptance of Mr. Chief Justice Warren's observation that
95. Bickel would agree, but not Gunther. A. BicKn, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 133-43 (1962); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Corn-
inent on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
96. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1033 (1968).
97. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
98. 405 U.S. at 740.
99. One source of this confusion is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
in Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951), in which standing
and justiciability are both reduced to a search for a feel of the past:
[bloth characterizations mean that a court will not decide a question unless
the nature of the action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the re-
lationship between the parties are such that judicial determination is consonant
with what was, generally speaking, the business of the Colonial courts and the
courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed.
Id. at 150. For a more convincing historical account, see Berger, supra note 78.
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[t]he fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the
party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and
not on the issues he wished to have adjudicated."' 0
However, this clarity can quickly be lost by failing to recognize that in
some instances the policies of standing are identical with those of justi-
ciability. If the real question is whether what the government has done to
its citizen is an injury of the sort judicial process should redress or pre-
vent, then an affirmative answer decides both who and what. Flast v.
Cohen... makes a useful example. The question in Flast was whether
federal spending for the benefit of religious schools' programs in secular
instruction violated the establishment clause. Pure establishment clause
cases often present special difficulties of standing if they conjoin only the
abstractions of church and state. Free exercise cases, on the other hand,
usually pose concrete situations in which a limited and identifiable group
of persons-Mormons with two wives, Amish who refuse to send their
children to school-are subject to state sanctions. The greatest pressure
for allowing taxpayers to sue in cases like Flast results from the fear that
otherwise the courts would be denied the opportunity to rule on the con-
stitutionality of expenditures allegedly used to establish a religion. As
expressed by M1r. Justice Fortas, concurring in Flast, a failure to recogn-
ize taxpayers or citizens as appropriate plaintiffs would consign the "sep-
aration of state and church. . . to limbo, unacknowledged, unresolved,
and undecided. 10
2
To remove a matter from limbo to the federal courts is to make it
justiciable. This decision ought to be justified by the demonstration that
courts in fact have the capacity to make useful contributions to the sound
resolution of the problem. The establishment clause cases subsequent to
Flast do not make such a showing. Walz v. Tax Commission0 3 for
example, sustained property tax exemptions for religious institutions
largely because the exemptions were rooted in long-established practice.
It is incongruous to find standing in order to permit the bringing of new
challenges, which are then dismissed on account of their novelty. But the
Court's difficulty in Walz was easy to see; exemption of religious property
from taxation is an inherently abstract question of proprieties, unillumin-
ated by the informing context of an individual put to more than psychic
suffering and peculiarly complicated by the possibility that the free
exercise clause may require exemption.
100. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
101. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
102. Id. at 116.
103. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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The problems of litigation to promote the natural environment seem
similar. Few could deny the general proposition that the bounty of nature
can no longer be wasted; but "a judgment or intuition more subtle than
any articulate major premise" '° is needed to reach a satisfactory alloca-
tion of natural resources to present popular consumption. The question
of standing for the environmental public interest organization amounts,
as a matter of policy, to asking whether there is something about the
action complained of that outfits the court to develop a useful intermediate
premise.
The role of the judiciary in environmental issues is a subject fully
treated elsewhere :.05 the present point is merely that the proper unfolding
of that role, rather than anything about the Sierra Club itself, is the im-
portant and difficult issue in the Sierra Club case. The public interest
plaintiff ought, of course, to be able to sue if it has a substantial inju~ry
which justifies relief without regard to the "public interest" other than
the interest in redressing private injury. Where the plaintiff relies on
the public interest alone, however, it ought to be required to show the
potential for constructive judicial contribution. The potential could be
shown in several ways. Where the legislation establishing the decision-
making function can be read to create a role for interests ignored by the
actual makers of the decision, the courts can compel attention to the slighted
interests. Such legislative warrant might be found either in the specific
administrative statutes..6 or in the generalities of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969.1"1 The Sierra Club opinion may indeed be
limited to the assertion of standing by statute. The opinion analyzes the
problem entirely in those terms, although the two cases it sets aside as
inapposite may be read as requiring injury in fact for standing to raise
constitutional rights.0 8 An often-quoted passage from Baker v. Carr,
quoted again in Sierra Club, defines standing as "personal stake in the
outcome" ;"' personal stake is usually considered a sort of code-word for
injury in fact"0 although the logical equivalence is not compelling, nor is
it obvious that the injury in Baker v. Carr was personal."' The opinion
104. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENIRONMENT (1971); Krier, The Pollu-
tion Problem and Legal Institutio s: A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
429 (1971)-; Comment, supra note 9.
106. Comment, supra note 9.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970). See note 21 supra.
108. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
109. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
110. Note, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: The Concept of Personal
Stake, 39 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 570 (1971).
111. It should be perfectly clear, therefore, that the interest sought to be
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in Flast v. Cohen also proceeds, formally at least, as an application of the
personal stake requirement to taxpayers." 2 Aside from these two cases
mentioned without invocation of authority, however, the Sierra Club
opinion relies on five cases construing statutes authorizing judicial review
of agency action," 3 and repeatedly describes the issue as "seeking judicial
review." A finding of standing without statutory authority would be
proper, however, either if traditional common-law remedies are avail-
able11 or if a constitutional doctrine of environmental protection can be
adequately defended."' However weak or counter-majoritarian the case
for a constitutional right to a decent environment, creating such a right
entails the conclusion that the judiciary ought to prevent elected officials
from degrading anybody's environment. In addition to guaranteeing
administrative attention to values the legislature elects to cherish, the
courts have established adverse possession to the function of overseeing
respect for the interests of those unable to present their own claims in
the political process. The harshest burdens of destroying the wilderness
will fall on the yet unborn-whom it may not be pure fancy to analogize
to the disenfranchised or the out-of-state."'
vindicated is either that of the public at large (Tennessee "as a polity," as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter put it in Colegrove v. Green) or at least that of a loose,
indeterminate, and very numerous group.
Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics In Search of Law, 1962 Sup. Cr. RFv. 252, 272.
112. "There remains, however, the problem of determining the circumstances
under which a federal taxpayer will be deemed to have the personal stake and interest.
." 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
113. 405 U.S. at 727 n.13.
114. See, e.g., Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effec-
the Judicial Intervention, 63 MIcE. L. Rxv. 471 (1970).
115. See Baude, Note: Constitutional Right to a "Decent Environment," in C.
MExas & A.D. TArLOcK, ENV1RONIENTAL PRoTEcTIoN 350 (1971).
116. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (disen-
franchised) ; South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2
(1938) (out-of-state). For a general discussion of justice between generations, see
J. RAwLs, A THEoRY OF JUSTICE 284-93 (1971).
